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GUILT, THE LAW AND TRANSGRESSION 
Russell Grigg* 
Kant famously held two apparently contradictory principles: first, 
that all that occurs in the empirical, phenomenal world is, necessarily, 
determined by prior events; and second that acts of the will are acts 
done freely. The freedom "in the strictest, that is, in the transcendental, 
sense" that Kant ascribes to the will is, as he acknowledges, 
incompatible with the determinism of the empirical world. I The 
freedom must therefore lie in the noumenal world and thus outside the 
empirical world governed by a priori causal laws. Kant's attempt at 
reconciling the freedom of the will with the determinism of the 
empirical world is widely considered unsuccessful. Therefore, the 
conclusion that either every event is determined or that some events are 
acts of free will seems inescapable. 
Why, then, did Kant ever seriously attempt to reconcile freedom 
and determinism in this way? Or, to put the question slightly 
differently, what grounds are there for countenancing even the 
possibility of free will? Because Kant accepts the first principle that 
everything in experience occurs according to causal laws, there can be 
no empirical grounds for this freedom. As such, he accepts that any 
cognition we may be capable of having of this freedom can not derive 
from experience. Kant finds these grounds elsewhere, namely, in our 
recognition of the moral law, which "forces this concept [of freedom] 
upon us," such that, were it not for the moral law, "one would never 
have ventured to introduce freedom into science."2 
Kant provides a famous example to illustrate the point: 
Suppose someone asserts of his lustful inclination that, when the 
desired object and the opportunity are present, it is quite irresistible 
to him; ask him whether, if a gallows were erected in front of the 
house where he finds this opportunity and he would be hanged on it 
* Russell Grigg practices psychoanalysis in Melbourne and teaches in the philosophy and 
psychoanalytic studies programs at Deakin University. 
I IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 5:29 (1788), reprinted in PRACTICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 163 (Mary 1. Gregor ed. & trans., \996). 
2 Id. para. 5:30, at 163. 
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immediately after gratifying his lust, he would not then control his 
inclination. 3 
For Kant there is no question of what the man will do. "One need not 
conjecture very long what he would reply," he writes, and he takes this 
to illustrate the nature of desire: a person's desire will always be 
subordinate to that most overarching desire-the desire for life. A 
person will therefore forego the most extreme pleasure if he is 
convinced that it comes at the price of death. Kant then contrasts this 
state of affairs with another: 
[A]sk [thissame person] whether, if his prince demanded, on pain of 
the same immediate execution, that he give false testimony against 
an honorable man whom the prince would like to destroy under a 
plausible pretext, he would consider it possible to overcome his love 
of life, however great it may be. He would perhaps not venture to 
assert whether he would do it or not, but he must admit without 
hesitation that it would be possible for him. He judges, therefore, 
that he can do something because he is aware that he ought to do it 
and cognises freedom within him, which, without the moral law, 
would have remained unknown to him.4 
Thus a man may still be prepared to do what he thinks is right, do what 
he believes in, do his duty, even though he knows that,his act will result 
in his own death. It is from the recognition of this possibility that we 
derive the concept of a free act. For Kant, then, if there were no free 
will there could be no duty, and the contrast between acting on a desire 
and acting for the sake of duty would not exist; he therefore takes the 
example to illustrate the difference between duty and desire. 
Lacan disagrees with Kant's analysis of the contrast between desire 
and duty and makes the entirely correct observation that a person may 
well be prepared to act on a desire in the knowledge that it will not be 
for his own good and may even result in his demise. Indeed, even in 
Kant's example, a person is quite capable of finding that the risks and 
dangers posed by the neighboring gallows add to the attraction of the 
transgression. 
As a matter of fact, Kant would not have had to go very far, even 
in his own time, to find an illustration of such a case-South and, either 
West to Paris where the Marquis de Sade was writing Philosophy in the 
Boudoir, or East to Vienna for Mozart and Da Ponte's Don Giovanni. 
Both illustrate the ambiguity of desire-an ambiguity that is present in 
Lacan's paper "Kant avec Sade"-which will not be clarified fully until 
later, with the concept ofjouissance. The ambiguity is that if we think 
of the satisfaction of desire as producing pleasure then desire will 
always find a limit beyond which pleasure is not produced. We can caB 
3 Id. 
4 !d. para, 5:30, at 163-64. 
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this limit the subject's well-being. But if, on the other hand, we think of 
desire as jouissance, then, as psychoanalysis has discovered, its very 
essence lies in its transgression. 
The point is, clearly, that jouissance and transgression form a 
couple: there is no jouissance without transgression. But the point 
becomes less clear when we ask what it is that has been transgressed. 
While it may seem obvious that the transgression is a transgression of 
the law, this does not exhaust all questions. Which law is transgressed? 
The moral law? The law of the land? These issues, which bear upon 
the question of the law and its relation to jouissance, are highly relevant 
to psychoanalysis. 
It is significant that, for Freud, psychoanalysis only recognizes one 
law: the Oedipal law that lies at the heart of all society-a law that 
every subject has always already transgressed. Any subsequent 
transgression is always and only a substitute. Yet even here there are 
further issues, for it is not as if Freud's Oedipus complex is unequivocal 
on the relationship between the law andjouissance. 
Perhaps it would be better to say that Freud has two quite separate 
and opposite views about the relationship between jouissance and the 
law, one of which is expressed in the Oedipal myth, the other in the 
myth of the primal horde. Both are myths of the father in Freud but 
with significant differences. The most striking difference is the 
inversion in the relationship between desire and the law. The Oedipus 
complex is meant to explain how desire and jouissance are regulated by 
the law. Both the Oedipus myth "borrowed from Sophocles" and the 
primal horde myth involve the murder of the father. The consequences 
of this murder are exactly opposite in the two cases because of the place 
the law occupies in each case. Both deal with what Lacan had 
previously been calling the Name-of-the-Father, a signifier intimately 
tied up withjouissance and its regulation by the law, yet the relationship 
between the law and jouissance that unfolds in each, oddly enough, 
ends up inverted. In the Oedipus myth, the law is there from the outset; 
it is an inexorable law, demanding punishment even when the 
transgression has been committed unwittingly. The law precedes 
enjoyment and enjoyment henceforth takes the form of a transgression. 
In Totem and Taboo, on the other hand, enjoyment is there at the outset, 
at least in appearance, and the law comes afterwards. This leads Lacan 
to say that there is "une schize, a split, separating the myth of Oedipus 
from Totem and Taboo."5 The reason? They are responses, 
respectively, to the clinical experience of hysteria and obsessional 
neurosis. The Oedipus complex is the myth that Freud creates in 
response to the clinic of hysteria and the myth of the primal horde father 
5 See Jacques Lacan, D'un discours qui ne serait pas du sembi ant (June 9, 1971 session), 
available at http://perso.wanadoo.fr/espace.freudltopos/psycha/psysem/semblan/semblan7.htm. 
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of Totem and Taboo is Freud's response to the clinic of obsessional 
neurosIs. 
Lacan discusses the issue of the relationship between jouissance 
and the law in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis and in "Kant with Sade" in 
relation to Antigone. It is not always clear what Lacan has in mind in 
these texts, particularly in "Kant with Sade." And there has been a 
tendency to conceptualize what he says in terms of a distinction 
between the "positive law" and some form of the Law, such as, 'for 
instance, the law of the super-ego. On this interpretation, it seems 
reasonably clear how positive law and the Law (of the super-ego) might 
differ: Antigone acts in the name of a higher law, in the recognition that 
Creon's law, which is the positive law, falls short of it. In her no-saying 
to the power of the city she can be allied with civil protesters, agitators 
and-why not?-terrorists in so far as she transgresses the positive law 
in the name of something "higher." 
I think this is not only incorrect but also trivializes the distinction, 
reducing it, as it does, to the recognition that the legal code and the 
moral code are not the same thing. For while it may be true that they 
are not the same thing, they are not entirely distinct either-and for 
good reason. Let me explain. 
First of all, there is the case of Dostoyevsky. When Freud came to 
explore the relationship between guilt and transgression he came to the 
view that the causal chain between them was sometimes the opposite of 
what we would ordinarily suppose. Common sense would have it that 
you feel guilty because of a transgression. But Freud speculates on 
cases where one transgresses because one feels guilty; and by 
transgressing you at least give the guilt an object. Thus, a person who is 
oppressed by an unconscious sense of guilt, who is therefore unaware of 
its origin, might commit a criminal act in order that the guilt he or she 
carries unconsciously can find a real and particular object. 
Melanie Klein reinforced Freud's views. Aware of the intense 
violence and extreme cruelty the super-ego displays towards the 
subject's unconscious desires, she recognized the unbearable situation 
in which this left the ego. The person's response is to externalize the 
guilt, which it does by committing some crime or transgression for 
which they will be apprehended and punished. Thus, Klein gives 
further support to Freud's thesis in suggesting that where the motive for 
criminal behavior is the externalization of unconscious guilt, the 
external situation in some way reflects the ferocious internal attack 
perpetrated upon the ego by a hostile and threatening superego. As a 
consequence, the real, external punishment becomes less threatening 
than the sadism of the superego, before which the ego feels itself to be 
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more or less entirely helpless.6 This is a process that can be understood 
as coming entirely under the pleasure principle--or at least would come 
under the pleasure principle were it not for the fact that, at the same 
time as the "crime" is externalized, punishment by an external agent 
will satisfy the ego's own desire for punishment. 
Note, incidentally, that Klein's analysis of guilt and transgression 
makes little reference to any Oedipal dynamics but relies very heavily 
upon an aggressiveness that is internal and innate. And in point of fact 
it is not quite accurate to say that Freud puts the guilt before the 
transgression, for the unconscious guilt in question has its own origin in 
Oedipal desires and wishes concerning the murder of the (primal) 
father. 
Of course, none of what Freud says about guilt and transgression 
will work unless the transgression is not only a legal transgression but a 
moral one as well. The transgression had better be a moral one, and 
moreover one that is symbolically linked to the original, unconscious, 
Oedipal crime. 
There is a second point about criminal transgression that I would 
like to mention: the case of war-time atrocities. There are three very 
common, though perhaps not universal, features of the war-time atrocity 
that are particularly relevant to the point I want to make concerning the 
light psychoanalysis is able to throw on criminal transgression. The 
first is that the perpetrators of the particular type of criminal act that we 
call war-time atrocity are, on the whole, otherwise good, decent and 
law-abiding citizens. That is to say, they generally have no previous 
history of criminal transgression and generally no subsequent history of 
violent crime either, a fact which in itself is quite remarkable. There is 
plenty of post-war trauma and mental illness, of course, but actual crime 
is much less frequent. The second fairly common characteristic is that 
such actions are generally condoned, or at the very least excused, by the 
people on whose side and on whose behalf those who commit the 
atrocities are fighting. Their readiness to fight and, if necessary, 
sacrifice their own lives is arguably a significant factor in this response 
by their people to their actions. The third feature, and the one I want to 
emphasize, is that wartime atrocities are rarely random events but 
generally display a symbolic, strictly Oedipal structure. We can see this 
most clearly when they take a ritualized form: the raping of women in 
the presence of a helpless, impotent, intimidated father or father-figure; 
or again, the specific forms that bodily mutilation takes. In this case, 
the atrocity, in its transgressive function, reflects the very form of the 
social fabric, and not only the social fabric of the victims but also of the 
perpetrators themselves. In other words, the transgression is an 
6 MELANIE KLEIN, Criminal Tendencies in Normal Children, in LOVE, GUILT AND 
REPARA nON AND OTHER WORKS 1921-1945, at 170-85 (1975). 
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expression of the symbolic laws, and not just as they pertain to the 
victims but also as they pertain to the perpetrators' group as well. 
Moreover, the symbolic link is what makes criminal behavior part of the 
subject's psychopathology. That is, criminal behavior is never in itself 
psychopathological. What makes criminal behavior psychopathological 
is the features it has in common with other, non-criminal, forms of 
psychopathology: typically, compulsive behavior, repetition and 
exaggerated remorse. There will also be a symbolic link with the 
history of the subject. 7 
The comparison between criminal behavior and psychopathology 
is similar to the case of the superego in relation to moral behavior, 
particularly the superego of the obsessional neurotic. As we know, the 
obsessional is a particularly moral individual. But what reveals the 
presence of the pathological superego in his moral rectitude is that 
indignation at the immorality of others is combined with a sadistic and 
inhumane adherence to the moral law. Or again, the obsessional 
sometimes manifests a readiness to devote himself to the well-being of 
others by his general love of humanity and warm devotion to everyone, 
but with the exception-and here's the rub-of those whom he loves 
the most. 
Thus, the psychopathological aspect to the behavior of the criminal 
manifests itself in the same way as it does in the behavior of the 
obsessional or any other neurotic. The psychopathology is not 
expressed by the act, criminal or otherwise, but in the form or general 
structure of the behavior in question, and so what is common to the 
behavior of the criminal act and psychopathology is the symbolic 
content. But in this respect whatever psychopathology might appear in 
criminal behavior is no different from psychopathology in other 
circumstances. Things are no different here than they are with respect 
to the differences between neurosis and psychosis. The themes are the 
same, the content of the symptoms and so forth are the same; where 
they differ is in the structure of the two conditions where one results 
from the process of repression, the other from foreclosure. However, 
Lacan also indicates that the fact that the psychotic's discourse is just as 
interpretable as neurotic phenomena, such as dreams, leaves the two 
disorders at the same level and fails to account for the major, qualitative 
differences between them. Therefore, if psychoanalysis is to account 
for the distinction between the two, it cannot do so on the basis of 
meaning alone. It can only do so on the basis of the "structure," and the 
structures it recognizes are those familiar to us in psychopathology: 
neurosis, psychosis and perversion. 
7 This point is discussed in JACQUES LACAN, A THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE 
FUNCTION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN CRIMINOLOGY (Mark Bracher et aI., trans., 1950); I, 2 J. FOR 
THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF CULTURE AND SOC'y (1997). 
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Where transgression is an expression of guilt it is essential that the 
transgression result in loss and punishment. But it doesn't necessarily 
have to be a criminal offence. A good, nasty marriage break-up where 
you lose the partner, kids and family home will do the trick just as well. 
We know the power of unconscious guilt in analysis, where it is not 
uncommon for unconscious guilt to become active, and the risk of 
major acting-out of this kind can be quite a serious consideration. To 
sum up this point, it is not merely a question of transgressing the law; 
the transgression has not just a legal dimension but a moral one as well. 
This point raises a new question about the relationship between 
law and morality. In our societies, the movement over the past, say, 150 
- 200 years has been to separate the law and morality, both 
philosophically--conceming in particular the justification of 
punishment-and in actual practice. Philosophically, ever since the 
emergence of the secular state and ever since the time of Jeremy 
Bentham's Panopticon, the "progressive" approach to punishment has 
been the utilitarian one of justifying it by its consequences: that is, 
punishment deters potential criminals and rehabilitates actual 
criminals-or it should at least aim at so doing.8 Completely foreign to 
this are issues around retribution, reparation and expiation. 
In my view, the notion of the therapeutic treatment of crime forms 
part of a general repressive approach to crime and transgression that 
began in the nineteenth century and that is best symbolized by the 
image of Bentham's Panopticon. The thesis is, of course, Foucault's, 
according to which the policy of reforming the individual offender 
emerged as the new form of social control to replace the former regime 
of punishment. The early interest by psychoanalysts in forensic issues 
led to the view that treating offenders was to be preferred over 
punishing them-better the couch than the cell. However, to this 
extent, psychoanalysis can be seen as contributing to a new view of 
punishment in our society, a view that reinforces the repressive function 
of the law. 
Now, psychoanalytic approaches to crime since Freud have 
generally fitted into this progressive approach, particularly in the hope 
that psychoanalysis may be able to contribute to crime prevention. 
There were a number of psychoanalysts, most with a background in 
psychiatry, who became forensic specialists in the belief that 
psychoanalysis had something to offer law enforcement, crime 
prevention and punishment. The British psychoanalyst Edward Glover 
contributed not only to debates on the investigation and treatment of 
crime over a long period from the 1920s to the 1960s, but was also 
involved in the founding of both the Institute for the Study and 
8 That Prisons Departments have become Corrective Services symbolizes this shift. 
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Treatment of Delinquency and an institution called the Psychopathic 
Clinic, the world's first ever psychiatric clinic concerned with 
delinquent study and therapy.9 Then, in Berlin in the late 1920s, Franz 
Alexander and the lawyer Hugo Staub published a book called The 
Criminal, the Judge and the Public, which produced a lot of interest at 
the time of its publication.1O Their work includes a number of case 
studies of criminal offenders, including one by Marie Bonaparte. The 
general tenor of these contributions can be described as "progressive." 
There is an appeal for a more compassionate understanding of the 
factors that lead to criminal behavior, and this combines with an 
enlightened, non-retributive approach to punishment, including the 
recommendation that treatment replace punishment. 
I don't know if any psychoanalysts have argued this, but some 
philosophers have appealed to psychoanalysis to argue that 
psychoanalytic theories of compulsive behavior and unconscious 
determinism imply that it is a mistake to blame offenders for their 
transgressions since their behavior is beyond their conscious control. 
Humans never really act freely and hence cannot be held accountable 
for their actions. This is not, however, the lesson of Freud. Freud's 
lesson is rather that you are responsible for your actions, even-
particularly-those that you do not know you are doing. 
Be that as it may, to view punishment as justified solely by its 
value as deterrent misses something of symbolic importance in any 
positive legal code. The point is that the law must in some way carry 
"moral weight," that is, it must be seen both to serve the interests of 
justice and to arise out of serious moral considerations. It is this 
connection with morality that makes for the difference in gravity 
between a serious crime such as murder and a lesser one like civil 
disobedience. And the connection between morality and the law can get 
out of kilter, as when the punishment for civil disobedience exceeds the 
gravity of the transgression. 
Renata Salec1 relies upon this point, if 1 read her correctly, when in 
The Spoils of Freedom she refers to the "lawlessness" of socialism. She 
describes a situation in which the law under socialism-the law, that is, 
that defines what is legal, what is prohibited, what is constitutional, 
what is not constitutional-was subordinate to the goal of constructing 
communism; the law thus became a purely utilitarian law in which the 
means were subordinate to the final "good." Salecl adds that under 
socialism the law was constantly transgressing itself, that the Party was 
constantly inventing new laws, constantly rewriting the constitution. 
The consequence of all this, however, was that there ended up no longer 
9 See EDWARD GLOVER, THE ROOTS OF CRIME, at xii (\960). 
10 FRANZ ALEXANDER & HUGO STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (Gregory Zilboorg trans., 193\). 
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being any identification with the system as such; people only obeyed the 
law because they were compelled to, because they were afraid of the 
consequences if they didn't. I I Implied here, then, is the fact that simply 
being afraid of the consequences is not enough. That is, the subject 
needs to accept the moral legitimacy of the law for the legal sanction to 
have the value of punishment. In the absence of this link with morality, 
punishment is transformed into something else: for instance, repression 
or revenge or, as in the case Saled describes, mere social control, where 
the subjects obey the law not because they agree with the law but 
because they are compelled to. 
Now, I believe that Saled's comments do not apply uniquely to the 
former socialist states but apply, perhaps in a slightly modified way, to 
capitalist societies as well. What she describes is a legal system based 
on a utilitarian approach to punishment devoid of any notion that the 
penalty must match the crime-a utilitarian rationale that appeals 
uniquely to the consequences of punishment. For socialism, there was 
one ultimate consequence: the conditions for the establishment of 
communism. Under capitalism, the rationale is that punishment deters, 
quarantines and rehabilitates: punishment deters potential criminals; 
incarceration quarantines actual criminals from society; and, perhaps 
less convincingly, punishment leads to the offender's rehabilitation. 
Unless we understand the law in this way and not just as a "positive 
legal code," we will not properly understand the relationship between 
law and its transgression. 
I have discussed three ways in which transgression and the law can 
be related and three corresponding "types:" 
The first is that described by Freud, where transgression 
externalizes guilt that is of unconscious origins and relates to the 
Oedipal situation. 
The second is that described by Kant, embodied by Antigone, 
where transgression is carried out in the name of the moral law. 
3. The third, described by Lacan, is the figure for whom 
transgression is itself a source ofjouissance. This is a figure, moreover, 
for whom the risk of loss and punishment compound the jouissance. I 
would like to end by adding a fourth, which brings us back to Freud. 
The fourth is the jouissance of the ascetic, of the saint-the 
jouissance of instinctual renunciation. As Freud puts it: 
Conscience. .. is indeed the cause of instinctual renunciation to 
begin with, but later the relationship is reversed. Every renunciation 
of instinct now becomes a dynamic source of conscience and every 
fresh renunciation increases the latter's severity and intolerance. 12 
II See RENATA SALECL, THE SPOILS OF FREEDOM: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM AFTER 
THE FALL OF SOCIALISM 99 (1994). 
12 SIGMUND FREUD, Civilization and its Discontents, in 21 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE 
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Thus, we too have tended to reduce punishment to a utilitarian function, 
albeit a correctional one; as a consequence, the retributive function and 
the converse expiatory function of punishment is so far removed from 
our modern sentiments that retributive justice is typically associated 
with the vengeful God of the Bible and the Talion Law. 
Yet we haven't given up totally on the retributive idea that the 
punishment must match the crime; the utilitarian approach has not so 
totally replaced the retributive philosophy that we think it is just to 
dissuade criminality by punishing the innocent where this would work. 
For example, the reason we consider it unjust to destroy the house of the 
family of those accused of crimes against the state, when the family 
members have not been implicated in the crimes themselves, is that 
however dissuasive the actions may be, it is still wrong to punish the 
innocent for the crimes committed by and in the name of another. 
And this brings us back to the start, where the idea emerged that 
psychoanalysis could contribute to advances in criminology by 
advocating treatment over punishment. For this is part of a mental 
health approach to crime and punishment. It seems logical to think that 
if the criminal can be shown to have committed his or her crime as a 
kind of passage it t'acle that is perpetrated in the name of a punitive and 
sadistic superego, then the offender needs help, not hanging. However, 
an unintended consequence of the approach that takes the blame out of 
crime seems to be that it compounds the malaise in civilization. 
Slavoj Zizek is sensitive to this point when discussing Kant's 
concept of Achlung, respect for another person, who should never be 
treated solely as a means, always as an end. "How," Zizek asks, "do we 
show respect" to a "criminal who cruelly and intentionally killed 
another person; how do we show proper respect for him?" Zizek 
replies, with characteristic hyperbole, "[b]y condemning him and 
shooting him, since this is the way we treat him as a free, reasonable 
person; whereas all the talk about the impact of social circumstances 
treats him 'disrespectfully'-that is, not as a free, responsible agent, but 
as a plaything of social mechanisms."13 Zizek is hyperbolical to the 
point of being misleading, because retribution need not entail cruel and 
excessive punishment, but simply respect for human dignity. This 
entails that the criminal be punished for his crime, and only for his 
crime, since this is the meaning of treating a person as an ends and not 
as a means, just as it entails that the law have moral legitimacy. 
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 64, 128 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 
1961). 
13 SLAVOJ ZIZEK, Kant with (or against) Sade, in THE ZIZEK READER, 283, 293 (Elizabeth 
Wright & Edmond Wright eds., 1999). 
